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Theorising Institutional Scandal and the Regulatory State  
Abstract  
One by one, UK public institutions are being scandalised for corruption, immorality or 
iŶĐoŵpeteŶĐe aŶd suďjeĐted to trial ďy ŵedia aŶd ĐriŵiŶal proseĐutioŶ. The state͛s historiĐ 
response to public sector scandal – denial and neutralisation – has been replaced with 
acknowledgement and regulation in the form of the re-vamped public inquiry. Public  
institutions are being cut adrift and left to account in isolation for their scandalous failures. 
Yet the state͛s atteŵpts to distaŶĐe itself froŵ its sĐaŶdalised institutions, while extending 
its regulatory control over them, are risky. Both the regulatory state and its public inquiries 
risk being consumed by the scandal they are trying to manage.  
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Introduction  
The UK is experiencing a proliferation of public sector institutional scandals. Following a 
succession of scandals involving the banking sector (Ashton & Christophers, 2015), 
politiĐiaŶs͛ expenses (Pattie & Johnston, 2012), state surveillance (Salter, 2015), and phone-
hacking by journalists (Keeble & Mair, 2012), Britain͛s public institutions – the BBC, the 
National Health Service, the police, the Crown Prosecution Service, schools and colleges, 
local authorities, and Parliament – have all been implicated in institutional child sex abuse 
scandals. In response to this proliferation of public sector scandals, there has been an 
increase in public inquiries. The Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse (IICSA), 
triggered by the multi-institutional Sir Jimmy Savile scandal and a raft of associated 
investigations, was established in 2015. Led by Justice Lowell Goddard, this public inquiry͛s 
remit exceeds that of any in British history. Its purpose is to establish the extent to which 
͚institutions have failed in their duty of care to protect children from sexual abuse and 
exploitation; to consider the extent to which those failings have since been addressed; to 
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identify further action needed to address any failings identified; to consider the steps which 
it is necessary for State and non-State institutions to take in order to protect children from 
such abuse in future; and to publish a report with recommendations͛ 
(https://www.iicsa.org.uk/about-us/terms-of-reference, accessed 26th February 2016). It 
will also examine allegations of child sexual abuse involving public figures. Though the 
IICSA͛s remit is expansive and includes both state and non-state institutions, its origins lie 
firmly in the public sector. It was established in response to ͚increasing reports of child 
sexual abuse in a number of institutions, including in the BBC, the NHS, in children͛s homes 
and in schools͛, and ͚growing reports of failures within the police to investigate allegations 
of child sexual abuse, and failures within the Crown Prosecution Service to prosecute these 
allegations͛ (https://www.csa-inquiry.independent.gov.uk/about-the-inquiry/background, 
accessed 26th February 2016). The inquiry timeframe is equally ambitious and will consider 
allegations of child sexual abuse dating back to 1945. The inquiry is expected to publish the 
final report around 2020. Simultaneous and separate public inquiries into institutional child 
sexual abuse have been established in Northern Ireland and Scotland.  
Scandal has become a key mechanism used by news media, pressure groups and social 
movements to demand inquiries and investigations into alleged corruption, incompetence 
and immorality. Yet despite its growing prevalence and, as we argue in this article, its 
escalating significance and impact, scandal has received little attention from sociologists, 
and still less from criminologists. This neglect is surprising since, by definition, scandals are 
intertwined with flows and abuses of official power and are key to governance and social 
order. Existing research indicates that scandals can have a corrosive impact on the 
reputational standing, credibility and legitimacy of institutions and contribute to a pervasive 
climate of suspicion in institutional and political elites (Davis, 2006; Garment, 1991; Moore, 
1995; Seldon, 2009; Thompson, 2000; Tiffen, 1999). In this article we develop an analysis of 
institutional scandal and the state reaction to scandal proliferation that builds on Blumer͛s 
(1986: 19) defining statement on symbolic interactionism:  
A network or an institution does not function automatically because of some inner 
requirements or system dynamics; it functions because people at some point do 
something, and what they do is a result of how they define the situation in which they 
are called on to aĐt… It is ŶeĐessary to recognise that the sets of meanings that lead 
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participants to act as they do at their stationed points in the network have their own 
setting in localized process of social interaction and that these meanings are formed, 
sustained, weakened, strengthened or transformed, as the case may be, through a 
socially defining process. Both the functioning and the fate of institutions are set by 
this process of interpretation as it takes place among the diverse sets of participants.  
It is our contention that institutional scandal proliferation and the state response to it have 
been transformed, and that both sides of this interactional dynamic – shaped by processes 
of interpretation and the resultant actions of diverse sets of participants – require analytical 
attention. Further, we argue that such an analysis, in addition to elucidating the workings, 
significance and impact of institutional scandal, offers insights into the ongoing 
reconfiguration of the relationship between citizen-consumers, the news media, public 
institutions and the regulatory state.  
The article proceeds as follows. First, we summarise existing research on the significance 
and impact of scandal to provide context for our analysis. Next, building on this literature 
and our own previous work (Greer & McLaughlin, 2012a, 2012b, 2013, 2015), we set out our 
process model of how contemporary institutional scandals activate and unfold. Thereafter, 
we extend our analysis to the under-researched area of the state͛s reaction to scandal. 
Considering the significance and impact of UK public sector scandal proliferation, we 
propose that the regulatory state͛s growing readiness to establish public inquiries – the 
IICSA being the most far-reaching example – is at once politically calculated and inherently 
risky. In the concluding section, we argue that analysing the activation and amplification of 
public sector scandals, and attempts to manage the scandal machine through the public 
inquiry, illustrates the contradictory logics of the regulatory state.  
 
The Significance and Impact of Scandal  
It is within US political science that most attention has been given to researching the 
significance and impact of scandals. This literature is characterised by case studies of high-
profile executive scandals involving elite individuals, with Watergate still standing as the key 
reference point (Dagnes, 2011; Davis, 2006; Entman, 2012; Garment, 1991; Ginsberg & 
Shefter, 1999; Rottinghaus, 2015; Rozell & Wilcox, 2000; Sabato et al., 2000). Media and 
 4 
communications scholars have tended to conceptualise scandal as a distinctive mode of 
tabloid infotainment, and focus primarily on celebrity scandals (Lull & Hinerman, 1997; 
Petersen, 2012). Among criminologists, Sherman (1978) has produced the only book-length 
analysis of scandal, relating to police corruption and reform. Most recently, Pratt (2008) has 
examined the capacity of scandal to threaten the legitimacy of systems of power, 
connecting them with the rise of penal populism as goǀerŶŵeŶt͛s try to win back public 
trust and confidence. Thompson (2000) and Castells (2009) have produced the most 
developed sociological analyses of mediated scandals. All contemporary scandals are by 
definition mediated since, as Thompson puts it, they are ͚literally played out in the media 
and the activities of media personnel and organisations, with their distinctive practices and 
rhythms of work, play a crucial role͛ (2000. p.74). Scandals have become a prized news 
commodity, it is proposed, because of their capacity to: generate financial gains through 
increased audiences; advance political agendas; validate the professional ͚watchdog͛ 
conception of investigative journalism; and allow news agencies to outdo their rivals. The 
result has been the creation of a distinctive scandal news market serviced by an industry of 
stakeholders and potential beneficiaries searching for scandalous stories, photographs and 
video footage. The commercial value of this market means that news agencies, irrespective 
of their target audience or ideological orientation, have little choice but to join in with the 
reporting of a high-profile breaking scandal. Thus corporate news media are now locked into 
a mode of reporting that amplifies scandals͛ prominence still further (Entman, 2012; Lull & 
Hinerman, 1997; Sabato et al., 2000; Thompson, 2000). Research indicates that US executive 
scandals have tended to be reported in the news media as exceptional and individualised 
incidents of corruption, incompetence or immorality by ͚bad apples͛ within a system that is 
otherwise deemed broadly sound. Much work on scandal has supported Hallahan͛s (1999: 
220) general point that people tend to ͚attribute problems to corrupt, inept, or irresponsible 
individuals. The result is to ignore systemic problems related to social organisation or 
societal resources available to deal with a problem͛. For many scandologists the exposure of 
scandalous transgressions reaffirms for citizens ͚that the process does work, that it does 
curtail the arbitrary exercise of political power, and that the political system by and large 
deserves the support and loyalty of all citizens͛ (Markovits & Silverstein, 1988: 9). Thus, in 
classic functionalist fashion, ͚the resolution of a scandal͛s challenge to the system is a 
reaffirmation and strengthening of the public͛s faith in that system͛ (ibid: 9). Recent US 
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research on executive scandals acknowledges their potentially deleterious effects, but 
ultimately still finds that they have little lasting impact on a resilient political process:  
The system… bends but does not break in the aftermath of these crises; it maintains 
good health and is responsive in predictable ways. The system reacts to investigate 
and admonish further wrongdoing in the aftermath of scandals: More legislative 
hearings are held to probe wrongdoing and more investigations by external and 
internal agencies are conducted. Ultimately, the institutional ramifications for 
executive scandals demonstrate impressive adaptability of the actors involved and the 
system at large͛ (Rottinghaus, 2015: 4).  
Thompson (2000) acknowledges the positive potential of scandals to raise important 
questions about the acquisition, uses and abuses of political power and the structures of 
accountability that seek publicly to regulate those who exercise such power. He also notes 
that ͚a major political scandal, or a series of lesser but cumulatively significant scandals, can 
help to create a culture of deepening distrust͛ among sections of the population who may 
be ͚inclined to distrust not just particular leaders or potential leaders, but politicians per se͛ 
(Thompson, 2000: 256). Thus counter to functionalist readings of US executive scandals, 
Thompson identifies the potential for a longer-term threat to the legitimacy of the liberal 
democratic process.  
Thompson͛s is a more holistic consideration of the potential cumulative impact of scandal 
proliferation. However, his conceptualisation of mediated scandals predates the rise of 
social media and does not address the processes of intermediatisation – the viral interaction 
within and between corporate and social media – with which were are concerned in this 
article. In this pre-digital media context, scandals are temporally constrained. They can 
develop over a period of time but ͚cannot continue indefinitely͛ because every scandal will 
͚either reach a point of termination (a confession, a resignation, the outcome of a trial, the  
result of an official inquiry etc.) or it will gradually fade out, as public interest wanes and 
media organisations decide that it no longer merits the attention once devoted to it͛ 
(Thompson, 2000: 72). Recent changes to this media context have shattered these temporal 
constraints. Situating scandals within global communication networks, Castells (2009: 242; 
247-248) identifies three important trends: first, the shift to news as infotainment elevates 
scandal to a prime, audience-grabbing news product; second, the corporate media 
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development of online platforms facilitates the rapid dissemination of scandal news to 
global audiences; third social media can be used by a variety of actors and interest groups to 
disseminate scandalous allegations. The result according to Castells (2009: 254) is the 
emergence of a scandal politics that is contributing to ͚a worldwide crisis in political 
legitimacy͛.  
While Thompson͛s and Castells͛ work has been instructive in developing our analysis of 
institutional scandal, neither considers how scandal proliferation is affecting state practice. 
For us this question is pivotal. Both spend time defining the political arena of liberal 
democracy and situating the activities of political actors, institutions and media within it. Yet 
while institutions and the state are referred to periodically, their analyses focus primarily on 
the plight of elite individuals who become embroiled in scandals, and on the possible 
consequences of scandal proliferation for public trust in politicians and the political process. 
We feel it is crucial also to theorise and research scandals at the level of state institutions, 
and to analyse the consequences of institutional scandals for contemporary modes of 
governance.  
Butler and Drakeford͛s (2005) research is insightful in this regard. Their constructionist 
analysis of post-War UK welfare scandals examines the role of claimsmakers in scandal 
generation, and the impact of those scandals on social policy. They identify the public 
inquiry as the critical interface between welfare scandals and the British state, and the key 
mechanism driving policy reform. It is argued that although inquiry reports are supposed to 
produce the definitive account of a scandal, they are in fact the result of a social process, 
layering one more voice on a highly contested definitional terrain. Their analysis of the 
public inquiry as the state response to welfare scandals, and the wider policy and political 
contexts out of which scandals arise and are understood, stops short of considering the 
changing mode of governance that shapes those contexts. Developing such an analysis is 
one aim of this article. Furthermore, while Butler and Drakeford recognise that the news 
media are key to the process of contestation through which scandals are framed for a mass 
audience, their case-studies, like Thompson͛s, all predate recent developments in 
communication technologies and ͚the media͛ here means the printed press. Butler and 
Drakeford are not concerned with processes of intermediatisation in the activation, 
amplification and viral dissemination of scandal. As with much of the US political science 
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literature, individual scandals are bracketed-off and examined in their own historical and 
policy context. This case-study approach limits consideration both of the amplification of 
scandals across different institutions and the interaction between different scandals over 
time.  
Building on the above literatures and our own ongoing empirical research, we develop an 
interactionist analysis of institutional scandal that considers the intermediatised context 
within which all such scandals now activate and unfold, the state response to scandal 
proliferation, and the impact of institutional scandal on contemporary governance. In the 
next section, we set out our conceptualisation of institutional scandal.  
 
Inside the Institutional Scandal Machine  
Institutional scandals clearly have a structure, but we do not view them primarily in 
structural terms. Rather we conceptualise institutional scandal as a process. Here we map 
out and describe some of the phases and characteristics that institutional scandals appear 
to share (see Figure 1). We stop short of proposing that our conceptualisation is fixed, still 
less deterministic, and are cautious about overgeneralisation. Our process model is 
intended as a guide to further empirical research so that it might be refined, challenged and 
improved across a variety of situations and contexts. Our aims in developing the following 
process model are: to identify what we see as the default position of many corporate news 
and social media outlets today – scandal hunting – and to systematically work through the 
subsequent phases of contemporary institutional scandals – latency, activation, reaction, 
amplification and accountability; and to analyse the transforming role of corporate news 
and social media in each of these phases, and the driving impact of ͚trial by media͛. We 
remain mindful of Blumer͛s (1986: 20) caution that, ͚One is on treacherous and empirically 
invalid ground if he thinks that any given form of joint action can be sliced off from its 
historical linkage, as if its makeup and character arose out of the air through spontaneous 
generation instead of growing out of what went before͛. For this reason, we are concerned 
also to demonstrate the interaction between ͚individual͛ and the ͚institutional͛ dynamics in 
the development of institutional scandals, and to illustrate the interaction not only between 
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different phases of a particular scandal, but between different institutions caught up in the 
viral process of scandal amplification and between different scandals over time.  
 
Insert Figure 1 about here  
 
Scandal hunting  
Scandal hunting has become the default position across the UK national press, and any 
number of online news and social media sites. It is a cost-effective business model which 
requires up-front investment, but holds the potential to deliver enormous returns 
(Economist, 7th July 2011). Scandal hunting can involve: sting operations in which public 
figures are ͚caught͛ engaging in scandalous behaviours by journalists in disguise; teams of 
journalists proactively seeking evidence to verify rumours and allegations that might in turn 
result in a new scandal scoop; or an open invitation – now a standard addition to many 
news sites – for consumers to share scandalous news. Journalists are prone at times to 
move as a noisy pack, acting in a manner that Tiffen (1999) describes as picking off small 
prey and resembling scavengers more than hunters. Heightened competition and 
uncertainty in the intermediatised news market is driving news agencies toward the 
proactive hunt for scandal. Today that hunt is relentless, and corporate news media 
antennae are constantly tuned-in to any possibility of a fresh scandal story. What is striking 
about scandal hunting is that all UK news agencies appear to be actively engaged in it, from 
the Daily Telegraph’s award-winning breaking of the politiĐiaŶs͛ expenses scandal in 2011, 
to the phone-hacking scandal reported by all UK newspapers that led directly to the closure 
of the 168-year-old News of the World in 2011, to the Guardian͛s Pulitzer Prize winning 
public service journalism for their articles about mass surveillance based on the leaks by 
Edward Snowden in 2013, and the Panama Papers data leak of 2016 exposing the offshore 
tax avoidance activities of the rich and powerful. The 2014 UK Press Awards were replete 
with winners across the spectrum of newspapers for scandal reporting in one form or 
another (http://www.pressawards.org.uk/page-view.php?pagename=Winners-2014, 
accessed 17th March 2016). While scandals may be activated and subsequently ͚owned͛ by 
particular news agencies – usually newspapers – scandals are intermediatised both across 
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and within national news outlets, and may be inflected differently depending on that 
outlet͛s ideological agenda. In addition to being commercially beneficial, scandal hunting is 
also inherently political. The overriding objective is to identify ͚latent͛ scandals that might be 
͚activated͛ through media exposure and developed through successive phases of our 
process model of scandal – reaction, amplification, and accountability.  
 
Latency  
In the latent phase, potentially scandalous transgressions are known to or suspected by 
others and may be ͚open secrets͛ within the institution, but they remain concealed from the 
wider world. Institutions can mobilise considerable resources and engage in various forms 
of denial, dismissal, diversion to displacement to neutralise the risks of the ͚uncomfortable 
knowledge͛ becoming public (Cohen, 2001; Marris et al., 2014). These techniques of denial 
and neutralisation help explain why most scandals never break. Witnesses at all levels of an 
institutional hierarchy can remain in denial. Even when victims and whistle-blowers 1 come 
forwards and make internal complaints or threaten to go public, alleged transgressors may 
deny all charges and senior managers may place the reputation of the institution above the 
rights of clients and employees and engage in dismissal or cover-up. Irrespective of an 
institution͛s internal turbulence, so long as the transgressions are not made public, the 
scandal will remain latent. We would propose that the corporate news media shift to 
scandal hunting as a primary business model and the social media transformation of 
scandals into viral phenomena means that an increasing number that might previously have 
remained latent are today being activated.  
 
Activation  
                                                          
1 In a context of intermediatised scandal-hunting, all citizen-consumers are viewed as potential whistleblowers 
and are actively encouraged by corporate news media to disclose scandalous allegations. The UK government 
has introduced new laws designed to protect whistleblowers against institutional retribution for disclosing 
͚ǁroŶgdoiŶg͛ at ǁork ;https://www.gov.uk/whistleblowing/what-is-a-whistleblower). Despite legal protection, 
the ǁhistleďloǁer͛s status is without guarantee. Across jurisdictions, their usefulness as a source of scandal 
activation will be determined by news media on a case-by-case basis . Any questions regarding their credibility 
may result in whistleblowers themselves becoming targets for trial by media.  
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In the networked society communication technologies are ubiquitous and information is 
abundant. Scandalous allegations against individuals and institutions may be circulated 
instantly and globally across any number of social media. But social media exposure alone is 
seldom sufficient to trigger a scandal͛s transition from the ͚latent͛ to ͚activated͛ phase. 
Scandalous allegations circulating on social media – however credible they may seem and 
however visible and widely consumed by networks of diverse publics – still only gain 
mainstream authority and validation once appropriated and recirculated by corporate news 
media (Chagnon & Chesney–Lind, 2015; Liebes & Blum-Kulka, 2004). Even then, the news 
media must be prepared not only to print or broadcast the alleged transgressions, but also 
to declare publicly that they know the transgressor͛s identity and are prepared to reveal it.2 
Because of initial uncertainty about an allegation͛s authenticity and source trustworthiness, 
and the risk of defamation or libel action, the decision by a news agency to give credibility to 
scandalous allegations is critical (Basinger & Rottinghaus, 2012). Editors must be satisfied 
that there is sufficient evidence to substantiate the allegations, that the alleged 
transgressions are relevant to the individual͛s or institution͛s public duties, and that 
consumers will care (Sabato et al., 2000). Doubts around any of these criteria may 
discourage news agencies from reporting allegations, even if they know them to be true.  
Thus even in a viral context of scandal hunting, scandal activation is not inevitable. It 
requires the interaction of the diverse sets of participants in the scandal process – victims 
and whistle-blowers, pressure groups and moral entrepreneurs, journalists and news 
agencies, the publics that consume the ͚news͛, and of course those who stand accused of 
the alleged transgressions. Each of these participants acts on the basis of their 
interpretation of the situation at their particular point in the network, and each – 
dependent on their power – has a more or less active part to play in a scandal͛s activation 
and development. Scandalous allegations circulating online may or may not provoke a 
reaction from the accused. Allegations that corporate news agencies are prepared to 
endorse through publication – turning them into ͚official͛ knowledge and giving the 
impression that they have been crosschecked and corroborated – are more difficult to 
ignore. Once printed or broadcast in the corporate media, the ͚validated͛ and mainstreamed 
                                                          
2
 It may not be in the best interests of the news agency to reveal an alleged transgressor͛s identity 
immediately. 
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scandalous allegations will inevitably spread to, or return to, social media, and circulate in a 
manner that is impossible to control.  
 
Reaction  
Scandal activation is intended to provoke shock, outrage and fascination from consumers, 
and a range of possible reactions from the accused, including confession and apology; 
excuse; justification; and defiance or denial (Schönbach, 2010). The typical institutional 
reaction is to prioritise the protection of its reputation against negative publicity (Gardner, 
2012). The techniques of denial and neutralisation used in the latent phase to prevent 
scandal activation may now be deployed in an attempt to close down the scandal and 
minimise reputational damage (Cohen, 2001; Katz, 1979; Marris et al., 2014; Rayner, 2012; 
Zerubavel, 2006). However, since public naming requires editorial assurance that the 
available evidence substantiates the allegations, the default news media position at the 
point of scandal activation is that the accused is guilty. Denial, therefore, is interpreted as 
public lying. Those accused of lying about or covering-up their alleged transgressions will be 
plunged into trial by media, in which claim and counter-claim are publicly scrutinised for 
validity, and which can fuel the scandal though the next phases of its development.  
Trial by media (TBM) is a key driver of institutional scandals. As we have established  
elsewhere (Greer & Mclaughlin, 2011, 2012a, 2013, forthcoming), TBM is a market-driven 
form of populist justice in which individuals and institutions are accused, prosecuted, 
judged, sentenced and permanently stigmatised in the ͚court of public opinion͛. The nature 
and target of such trials are diverse – from identifying and hounding public figures and 
institutions perceived to think they are above the law or deemed to have offended against 
an assumed moral consensus, to pre-judging the outcome of investigations involving 
͚unknowns͛, to ͚retrying͛ those considered to have evaded formal legal justice, to 
condemning whole institutions or the state itself for failing to deliver on obligations and 
responsibilities. The scandalous charges that drive TBM range across the categories of 
corruption, immorality and incompetence.  
British newspapers have always cast themselves as barometers of the public temper, 
arbiters of the public interest and guardians of public morality. By encouraging news 
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consumers to engage in immediate ͚red button͛ judgement, TBM reclaims aspects of 
͚justice͛ from the courts and returns them to a networked citizenry. The extra-legal news 
media investigation of suspected crimes and criminals can lead to legal prosecutions that 
otherwise would not have occurred, and in that sense trial by media has clear potential to 
deliver justice by activating due process. But TBM also challenges and subverts it. In a direct 
inversion of due process, TBM cases are premised on a presumption of guilt. This 
presumption of guilt, in turn, precipitates a relentless search for other forms of 
incriminating ͚evidence͛ that serve to flesh out the image of the aĐĐused as ͚guilty͛ – of this 
transgression, of this transgression and others, if not of this transgression then of something 
equally bad on another occasion.3 While both criminal and civil legal cases tend to regard 
(with some exceptions) opinion and hearsay evidence as inadmissible, ͚evidence͛ in TBM 
varies dramatically from that which might be legally admissible to conjecture and 
insinuation. Newspaper editors and lawyers must only be persuaded that the available 
evidence – whatever it is – is sufficiently robust (or newsworthy) to justify the risk of libel 
action, irrespective of whether or not that evidence would stand up in a court of law. Those 
who maintain their innocence, exercise their right to reply or seek legal remedy risk 
escalating scrutiny aimed at uncovering further evidence to persuade news consumers of 
their guilt. Each stage of TBM is intensified through the involvement of social media. In the 
process of intermediatisation we witness a shredding of the distinction between public and 
private information. The outcomes of TBM may vary from a chilling of public sentiments 
towards the ͚accused͛ (whether individual or institutional), through permanent 
stigmatisation, to criminal prosecution, to the introduction of new regulatory frameworks, 
to changing institutional practice and wider policy reform.  
TBM uses the naming and disintegrative shaming of individual and institutional 
͚wrongdoers͛ to dramatise and clarify moral boundaries (Braithwaite, 1989; Cavender et al., 
2010), in many cases conjuring in nostalgically reactionary manner a fictional, morally 
cohesive past. In this sense, TBM can be and often is conservative. Yet TBM is not always 
driven by the desire to maintain the status quo and protect establishment interests. On the 
contrary, it is establishment elites representing the full political spectrum who increasingly 
                                                          
3 There is an extensive literature on the subversion of due process, not least miscarriages of justice, from 
within the criminal jutice system (Huff & Killias, 2008; Woffinden, 1987). Our comparison here is with how due 
process is supposed to work.  
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find themselves in the firing line. TBM is politically and normatively complex, and grasping 
this complexity is key to understanding its defining role within contemporary institutional 
scandals.  
 
Amplification  
For scandal amplification to occur the actions of individual transgressors need to be 
connected with wider institutional structures and practices. As noted above, US executive 
scandals tend to be reported in the news media and understood more widely as exceptional 
and individualised disruptions to the smooth running of a system deemed otherwise broadly 
sound. Our research on UK institutional scandals indicates that scandal amplification shifts 
the focus of attention from the individual and exceptional to the institutional and systemic.  
A scandal can amplify for a variety of reasons. The investigation of an individual alleged 
transgressor may implicate others within the same institution to the extent that the 
scandalous behaviour can be described as normalised and the institution itself systemically 
corrupt, immoral or incompetent. It may become apparent that the institution knew about 
the alleged scandalous behaviour, whether perpetrated by one individual or many, failed to 
prevent it, somehow facilitated it, or actively covered it up. Evidence may come to light that 
the alleged transgressions took place across multiple institutions, indicating a network of 
scandalous activities that required some form of institutional coordination or complicity. 
Whatever the mechanism, as a scandal amplifies from the individual to the institutional 
level, the order of seriousness increases. If a scandal is contained at the individual level – 
the preferred outcome for institutions seeking to limit reputational damage – the institution 
can deal publicly and robustly with the transgressor and emerge re-legitimated from the 
ordeal, having visibly purged itself of the bad apple. While individualised scandals may be 
resolved with individualised solutions, institutionalised scandals require institutional reform 
– of policy, practice, training, or structures of accountability. Such reform, implying the 
whole barrel may be rotten, can be costly, time-consuming and highly damaging to the 
institution͛s reputation. In a mixed economy of inter-agency service provision, an amplifying 
scandal can quickly consume multiple institutions.  
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Accountability  
If a scandal is successfully contained at the individual level the accountability phase involves 
the separation of individual and institutional accountability. The focus remains fixed on the 
alleged transgressor, who may be subjected to trial by media, institutional discipline, and/or 
legal prosecution. The institution itself remains the backdrop rather than the main focus of 
attention. Faced with mounting media pressure and intensified investigation, and isolated 
from her/his institutional employer, the alleged transgressor may choose to tender a public 
confession and apologise, or continue to protest her/his innocence. As many public figures 
have learned to their cost, continued denial (even if ultimately found not guilty in court) can 
be costly, merely prolonging trial by media as the legal case continues.  
Should institutional attempts at containment fail, the accountability phase of an amplifying 
scandal involves the conjoining of individual and institutional accountability and asks who 
else is guilty? Individual ͚guilt͛ generally relates to involvement in the transgressive act 
behind the unfolding scandal. The more senior the transgressor, the more serious the 
scandal. As a scandal amplifies through the institutional hierarchy, the notion of ͚guilt͛ 
amplifies with it. Blame can be attributed not only to the alleged perpetrators, but also to 
the senior managers responsible for the institutional structures, practices and wider culture 
that failed to prevent, facilitated, or sought to cover-up the scandalous behaviour when it 
became known. As more individuals are implicated in the interlocking and mutually 
reinforcing elements of an amplifying scandal, intermediatised outcry and calls for justice 
grow louder. Truth-seeking investigations simultaneously fuel scandal hunting and 
amplification by attempting to unearth evidence to corroborate the initial allegations and 
digging deeper into a widening range of individual and institutional practices with a view to 
discovering new or supplementary accusations, accusers and targets for trial by media. The 
reputation of entire institutions can be destroyed by scandal. Yet for justice to be seen to be 
done, particularly in a context of TBM-driven scandal amplification, individuals must be held 
to account. In this conjoining of individual and institutional accountability, it is the most 
senior figures who become the focus as news media go in for the kill.  
Not all individuals or institutions accused of scandalous transgressions and targeted by trial 
by media are prosecuted, still less found guilty, in a court of law. In the face of high-profile 
no further action or not guilty verdicts, the interpretive processes shaping the sĐaŶdal͛s 
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news media construction are adapted accordingly. Whistle-blowers and alleged victims – 
increasingly encouraged by the authorities to come forwards and report their victimisation – 
are recast by sceptics as opportunists, liars and fantasists. The authorities, in turn, tasked 
with establishing the ͚official truth͛ and delivering justice for victims and society, may 
themselves be implicated in the ongoing process of scandal amplification, accountability and 
hunting. The justice system is ridiculed for wasting tax payers money by bringing the cases 
to court. The professional and private lives of the alleged transgressors, now formally 
acquitted, may already be irreversibly stigmatised by TBM, and they may still find 
themselves judged guilty in the court of public opinion. In such cases, only the news media 
benefit, since whatever the outcome of the accountability phase the scandal story continues 
to sell.  
We now turn our attention to the wider significance and impact of public sector institutional 
scandal. What follows is exploratory and in places speculative, but we feel it is important to 
engage with the broader picture in order to suggest directions for theory-building and 
further empirical research.  
 
Managing the Institutional Scandal Machine 
We have argued that scandal has been elevated to a premium genre across news markets 
and that scandal hunting is now a business model. Corporate and social media are thriving 
on the proliferation of UK public sector scandals by cumulatively and relentlessly portraying 
a permanent crisis in governance brought about by the failure of core public institutions in 
which corruption, incompetence or immorality are systemic. Responsibility for the effective 
administration of these institutions, and therefore accountability for their failure, has 
traditionally rested with the state. The news media reporting of scandal as institutionalised 
and systemic thus implicates the state, as the responsible authority, as a key part of the 
problem. The state, in turn, is forced to act.  
There is an ongoing debate about what we would define as the de-institutionalisation of the 
state and its consequences for public services in Britain. What Rhodes (1994, 1997) terms 
the ͚hollowing out͛ of the state embodies four interrelated trends: privatisation and limiting 
public intervention; contracting-out central and local government services to external 
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agencies; loss of functions by national governments to transnational governance; and 
limiting public servants͛ discretion through managerial accountability and enhanced political 
control. Two key consequences of these trends are the fragmentation and diminished 
accountability of the state. Rhodes (1994: 149) further proposed that the combination of 
fragmentation and diminished accountability would erode the state͛s governmental capacity 
to steer and heighten the risks of catastrophic service failures. Responding to critics who 
argue that recent trends have in fact bolstered the state͛s core political and administrative 
control mechanisms, in more indirect but nonetheless more penetrating and effective ways 
(Holliday, 2000; Marinetto, 2003), Rhodes (2007) accepts that the core executive can act 
decisively through coordination and control in certain circumstances. He maintains, 
however, that the task of central steering has become more complex and reliant on power-
dependent relations with other actors and organisations, and that too little attention has 
been paid to the ͚sour laws of unintended consequences͛ (Rhodes, 2007: 1255). Paramount 
among these unintended consequences, we would argue, are the heightened risks of 
scandals presented by the hollowed out state͛s residual public institutions which, as Strange 
(1996) has noted, are seemingly blighted by service delivery failure in the face of rising 
citizen-consumer expectations. These risks and failures must still be managed, and so the 
state is forced to act. Consistent with our interactionist approach, we view this action not as 
͚a ŵere release of aĐtiǀity ďrought aďout ďy the play of iŶitiatiŶg faĐtors͛ (Blumer, 1986: 54). 
Rather, the state finds itself confronted with a situation in which it must engage and cope 
with scandal proliferation across its residual institutions, interpret and analyse it, and 
construct a line of action to manage it.  
Power (2004: 12-13) places risk management at the heart of neoliberal governance, arguing 
that it has become a mode of organisation in its own right:  
This phenomenal expansion of the risk industry reflects a number of different but 
contingent pressures for change in organisational practices for dealing with 
uncertainty. There has been a fusion of ideas about organisational governance and 
corporate respoŶsiďility… Neǁ ŵodels of regulatioŶ are iŶ ǀogue. “ĐaŶdals aŶd Đrises 
of the past ten years have been catalysts for the emergence of a conception of risk 
management with wide scope, unifying traditionally separate areas, such as health 
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and safety, insurance and project management under a single model but also 
absorbing new objects of concern.  
The logics of risk management are also central to regulatory state theory, which is 
concerned specifically to understand the emergence of new models of regulation 
(Braithwaite, 2000; Burgess, 2011; King, 2007; Moran, 2003; Veggeland, 2009). By 
connecting these insights, we can begin building a theoretical framework that can make 
sense of the lines of action constructed by the regulatory state to govern the risks presented 
by scandal within its failing public institutions. Regulatory state scholars have proposed that 
we are witnessing an emergent state form that has displaced Keynsian social security 
models of governance. The regulatory state is ͚premised upon a neo-liberal combination of 
market competition, privatized institutions, and decentred, at-a-distance forms of state 
regulation͛ (Braithwaite, 2000: 222). In the shift to a regulatory mode of governance, the 
state has reorganised its governmental structures and recalibrated the strategies and 
methods used to deliver public goods and services. Moran (2003) agrees with Rhodes that 
the process of hollowing out has diminished the state͛s policy competence, symbolic capital 
and sovereignty to the point that its governmental capacity has been reduced to 
͚regulation͛. Today the British state is constituted through a complex, decentred regulatory 
regime of quasi-autonomous agencies. It is responsible for implementing the rules, 
standards and regulations that govern the relationships between citizen-consumers and the 
͚market͛ in which they receive contractualised, publicly funded goods and services, but is 
primarily responsible neither for the maintenance of those relationships nor for the delivery 
failures of the institutional service providers. 4  
The implications of the decline of citizens͛ trust in and deference toward institutional 
authority have been widely discussed (Fukuyama, 2006; Seldon, 2009; Young, 2007). Less 
has been written about the state͛s collapse of trust in and deference toward its own historic 
institutional arrangements. The legitimacy and authority of the 21st century regulatory state 
is no longer inextricably linked to the reputation of its core public institutions. Rather, it 
derives from a commitment to enhancing institutional accountability through transparency, 
                                                          
4 The responsibilised citizen-consumer (Clarke et al., 2007) – now empowered to choose within a free 
marketplace of public goods and services – may be more inclined to complain when publicly funded 
institutions fail to deliver adequate services. 
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openness, scrutiny, audit, review and performance management (House of Lords Select 
Committee on the Constitution, 2005). Faced with a succession of interconnected and 
amplifying scandals across the BBC, the police, the National Health Service, the Crown 
Prosecution Service, and the education sector, among others, public institutions become 
risks to be offset and liabilities to be regulated and reformed, rather than assets to be 
supported and protected. And yet, the ͚risk management of everything͛ itself produces new 
risks, including Rhodes͛ ͚sour laws of unintended consequences͛.  
 
Institutional Scandal and Public Inquiry  
The relentlessly adversarial news media are attuned to the regulatory state͛s logics of de-
institutionalisation and risk management, and will not hesitate to challenge its commitment 
to transparency, scrutiny, audit and review. In an attempt to re-appropriate control of the 
news agenda and reposition itself as part of the solution rather than part of the problem the 
state must attempt manage the scandal machine. The key mechanism used in pursuit of this 
objective is the public inquiry:  
The term ͚public inquiry͛ has a very broad meaning, and the history of the British 
government shows that there are in fact a number of forms of ͚inquiry͛ available, 
designed, in principle to fulfil specific functions. Sometimes the wish may be simply to 
establish the relevant facts, leaving their interpretation, the allocation of ͚blame͛ and 
recommendations for the future to other agencies such as Ministers, Parliament or 
the courts. In other circumstances it may be thought desirable that the ͚inquiry͛ itself 
undertake these broader, perhaps more delicate tasks. A prime purpose of some 
inquiries may also be to allay public (and Parliamentary) disquiet about some public 
issue or a ͚scandal͛ (House of Commons Library, 2004).  
In the UK, public inquiries can be authorised by institutions or on a statutory basis by the 
state (Beer et al., 2011). Burgess (2011) has analysed the increase in public inquiries from 
the 1950s to the early-2000s, and notes that it cannot be understood simply in terms of an 
increase in sufficiently serious incidents, but must be situated within the wider political 
context that shapes decision making. That said, the suggestion that inquiries are ͚casually 
instigated in response to every demand͛ is equally unrealistic, since it ͚rejects any notion of 
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political choice and agency… They reŵaiŶ aŶ iŶstruŵeŶt of last resort, partiĐularly ǁheŶ 
they concern events that occur under the incumbent administration͛ (Burgess, 2011: 10, 
11). With respect to the proliferation of UK public sectors scandals, the regulatory state͛s 
increased inclination to accommodate the demands of news media-driven campaigns for 
public inquiries indicates that they are no longer an instrument of last resort. Rather, we 
would propose that it can be understood as a line of action constructed to regulate public 
sector scandals through the reconfiguration of three key dynamics – responsibility, 
accountability and time.  
Establishing a public inquiry contributes to redefining state responsibility from ensuring the 
effective administration of its core institutions in order to improve the quality of public 
services, to initiating an investigative process when those institutions fail and people are 
harmed. Public sector scandals become crises first to be addressed within the managerial 
hierarchy of the institution in question. The regulatory state intervenes only when that 
institution͛s internal procedures have demonstrably failed to deliver accountability in a 
manner satisfactory to the news media.  
Establishing a public inquiry redefines accountability by repositioning the regulatory state as 
part of the solution rather than part of the problem. As Rhodes (1994) predicted, the 
hollowing out of the state creates layers of institutional complexity that obscure notions of 
who is accountable to whom and for what. In a context of contracting-out, operational 
management is detached from state accountability (House of Lords Select Committee on the 
Constitution, 2005; Jordan, 1992, cited in Rhodes, 1994). Furthermore, as Burgess (2011) 
has pointed out, inquiries operating in a culture of risk management are predisposed to 
understand individual incidents as a consequence of deficient institutional arrangements, 
and to demonstrate independence by demanding wholesale reform of those arrangements. 
The state can use these blurred lines of accountability and embedded risk-based 
assumptions to deflect culpability for public sector scandals away from itself and more fully 
onto the institutions in question. Indeed, the state͛s involvement in public sector scandals 
today signals that the scandalised institution will be held to account for a double-failure – 
the normative failure to deliver on its public service responsibilities, and procedural failure 
to self-regulate and control its own practices.  
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Establishing a public inquiry facilitates temporal regulation of scandals. It conveys a sense of 
decisive action in a classic example of impression management, whilst at the same time 
extending the operational timeframe. High cost, procedurally and legally complex, multi-
facetted inquiries may take years to undertake and run across successive elections cycles. By 
the time an inquiry finally reports, one government may have been replaced by another. 
Even if the same government is still in power, it will have had ample time to consider 
possible outcomes and prepare a series of carefully timed responses to further mitigate its 
own responsibility and accountability. The scandal may be relegated to a ministerial 
footnote rather than an administration-defining heading. For cynics, establishing public 
inquiries in the wake of institutional scandals constitutes little more than a delay tactic as 
part of a longer-term state strategy of bureaucratising conflict (Blom-Cooper, 1996; Elliott & 
McGuinness, 2002; Gilligan & Pratt, 2013; Keller, 2014; Sedley, 1989). Should the inquiry – 
as is likely – connect individual scandalous transgressions with systemic institutional failings, 
the state will be able to claim strong justification for continued radical public sector reform 
in line with the twin-track regulatory strategies of managerialism on the one hand, and 
market competition and privatisation on the other. 
We would suggest, therefore, that regulatory state͛s changing reaction – from a 
commitment to protect the reputation of its public institutions, to an unsentimental anti-
statism position of distancing itself from those institutions and, by establishing public 
inquiries, ceding to external authorities power in the pursuit of ͚truth͛ and ͚accountability͛ – 
is driven by two interrelated objectives. In the shorter term, the objective is to avoid 
reputational damage through scandal by association – the risk that the current succession of 
public sector scandals will diminish the state͛s perceived honesty and competence. In the 
longer term, the objective is the ongoing reconfiguration of the state͛s relations with its 
residual public institutions. Thus the regulatory state increasingly rejects denial and 
neutralisation as the default responses to scandalous allegations of incompetence, 
immorality or corruption within public institutions. Instead of placing above all else their  
reputational protection, it readily concedes that the alleged transgressions may have taken 
place, but must be fully investigated before culpability can be established and any guilty 
parties held to account. It then acts – publicly and decisively – to begin that investigative 
process.  
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Yet establishing a public inquiry is inherently risky and can create as many problems as it has 
potential to resolve. Public inquiries, in their classic state-authorised form, were part of the 
state͛s defensive structure – self-legitimating, operating with chairs who were pillars of the 
establishment and utilising bureau-legal procedures that were exclusionary in nature (Blom-
Cooper, 1996). The chairs and members did not need to be told that their primary role was 
to safeguard state institutions by neutralising scandals. Deliberations and conclusions were 
shaped by the following neutralising procedures:  
(a) narrowing the focus of attention (͚sticking to the immediate facts͛) 
(b) historicising the scandals (͚that was then͛) 
(c) exceptionalising the wrong-doing (͚need for a sense of perspective͛)  
(d) acknowledging faults (͚mistakes had been made͛) 
(e) dispersing responsibility (͚multiple versions of events͛) 
(f) apportioning low-level individual blame (͚rotten apples͛)  
(g) avoiding a repeat scandal (͚lessons to be learned͛) 
In the context of a prevailing culture of deference, the welfare state could depend on the 
chair͛s public standing and political neutrality to counter any accusations that public 
inquiries were cover-ups and/or whitewashes. In a fundamental shift, public inquiries 
established by the regulatory state are immediately subjected to intense and adversarial 
public examination. The Đhair͛s credibility, the appointment process itself, and the suitability 
of inquiry members will be scrutinised and tested across news and social media forums, and 
trial by media of anyone deemed unacceptable or inappropriate is an ever-present risk. The 
first two Chairs of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse (IICSA), Baroness 
Elizabeth Butler-Sloss and Fiona Woolf, were subjected to gruelling trial by media. Both 
resigned.  
The functioning and aims of the contemporary public inquiry have also changed. In the 
evolving regulatory context, public inquiries are more reflexive and transparent in their 
workings and methods, holding open hearings and maintaining interactive websites. 
Navigating through the contemporary scandal minefield obliges inquiries to  demonstrate 
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their independence, impartiality, thoroughness and accountability by publishing evidence 
for public scrutiny as they proceed. They are more explicitly victim-centred, incorporating 
victim input into their terms of reference and ensuring victim participation throughout 
proceedings. There is also greater willingness to acknowledge the conflicting pressures and 
expectations that surround public inquiries. Lord Laming, who chaired the Victoria Climbié 
Inquiry, summarises the new sensibilities, stating that inquiries must: ͚provide an assurance 
that the facts surrounding an alleged failure will be subjected to objective scrutiny. They are 
expected to reach judgements on why terrible events happened. They often make 
recommendations on how such events might be prevented in future. They may give relief to 
some and allow the expression of anger and outrage to others. They are often disturbing 
and painful events͛ (House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee, 2005: 9).  
As we have seen with the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, public inquiries have 
also been transformed in terms of their historical remit, investigative powers, resources, 
technological capabilities and relationships with the criminal justice process. They have the 
capacity to dissect institutional scandals in ways that were not possible in the past and, 
through their communication strategies, can impact directly on public understanding of the 
institutional scandal. However, the failure of a public inquiry to fulfil any of its stated 
commitments or meet the expectations of stakeholders and citizen-consumers will intensify 
the institutional crisis and fuel the scandal machine, with demands for an inquiry into the 
botched inquiry. Under such risky circumstances, the public inquiry becomes the official 
epicentre of the institutional scandal.  
 
Conclusions  
Scandals will always have an infotainment edge, but that does not make them trivial. By 
triggering public inquiries that might take years to complete, and naming multiple alleged 
offenders in the process, institutional scandal is transforming how justice is administered in 
the UK. In the first part of this article we developed a process model of institutional scandal. 
In the second part, we examined the reaction of the regulatory state to public sector 
scandal proliferation. Our aim has been to analyse the transforming nature, significance and 
impact of institutional scandals and the forms of regulatory governance to which they are 
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giving rise. We have identified scandal hunting as a business model for both corporate news 
media and social media, and highlighted the interaction between phases of individual 
scandals, and between scandals over time. Institutional scandals are best conceptualised as 
mutually reinforcing within an intermediatised news market where the boundaries between 
͚old͛ aŶd ͚Ŷeǁ͛ ŵedia have become irrelevant and institutional failure has become the 
defining explanatory trope. Our conceptualisation seeks to better capture the viral 
processes through which scandals activate and amplify within and between institutions and 
individuals, and their temporally unconstrained and ungovernable nature.  
In the UK, as a result of the continuing amplification of the Sir Jimmy Savile scandal (Greer & 
McLaughlin, 2013), the floodgates have opened and scandal consciousness has intensified to 
unprecedented levels. Categories of behaviour deemed potentially scandalous have 
widened and every public institution runs the risk of reputation-shredding accusations. The 
ubiquity of scandal stories means that news agencies can choose which scandals to 
investigate in line with their own ideological agendas. While citizens have traditionally been 
attracted as news consumers, they are now recruited as active participants in the process of 
scandal hunting, activation and amplification. In this sense, corporate news media and social 
media can become alternative platforms for delivering ͚justice͛ to victims who for decades 
may have been denied legal recourse by institutional and state cover-up. The regulatory 
state, in its turn, is adapting its response to public sector scandal, and appears increasingly 
inclined to establish public inquiries. Scandalised public institutions are no longer 
invulnerable. They are being cut adrift from automatic state protection and left to account 
for themselves with potentially catastrophic consequences. Inquiries into the failures of 
public institutions generate recommendations that in turn are being politicised to fuel 
further radical public sector reform. In redirecting its responsibility and accountability in the 
face of public sector scandal proliferation, the regulatory state is simultaneously seeking to 
distance itself from its residual public institutions, whilst extending its control over them.  
We have argued, however, that the ĐoŶtradiĐtory logiĐs driǀiŶg the regulatory state͛s 
attempts to manage the scandal machine risk unintended consequences, not least because 
of the transformed public inquiry. Unlike its welfare state predecessor, today͛s public 
inquiry is immediately interpellated into the scandal machine. Its members, processes, 
practices and findings may be subjected to trial by media just as much as those implicated in 
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the scandal it has been established to regulate. Scandals are challenging the defining 
qualities of competence and honesty that determine the trustworthiness and legitimacy of 
public sector institutions and the individuals that work in them. Their impact extends 
beyond justifying the continued hollowing out of the regulatory state. Institutional scandals 
are hollowing out the cherished history and memories of the post-War welfare consensus. 
Testing our process model of institutional scandal with comparative empirical data on both 
public and private institutions, and crucially on scandals that did not activate as well as 
those that did, will lead to a deeper understanding of the global rise of scandal 
consciousness and the significance and impact of institutional scandal across different 
media environments and state formations.  
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